Stephen's declaration in Proteus, "You will not be
master of others or their slave," suggests that he has been
reading German philosophical thoughts about self-realization.
Theorization of the master-slave dialectic originated with
Hegel, but many later thinkers took it up, including
Nietzsche. Although Hegel and Nietzsche were engaged in very
different philosophical projects, their thoughts about masters
and slaves bear interesting connections to one another, and to
Joyce.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's The Phenomenology of
Spirit (1807) introduced the binary opposition Herrschaft
und Knechtschaft into the philosophical lexicon, as one
aspect of the dialectical struggle between antithetical forces
that defines the development of Geist (Spirit,
Mind, absolute self-consciousness). The master-slave dialectic
plays itself out between human beings and also within
individual subjects. It is a struggle that cannot be resolved
by the extinction of either master or slave: both lack full
self-consciousness, because each sees elements of itself
within the other. Hegel envisions a state of sublation (Aufheben)
in which the exclusionary oppositions are somehow transcended,
and master and slave become equals.
Nietzsche's thoughts are rather different. In The
Genealogy of Morals (1887) he distinguished the "slave
morality" of the Judeo-Christian tradition from the
aristocratic morals of the ancient Greeks and Romans. The
slave tradition advocates values such as kindness, humility,
and selflessness, and is animated by resentment of the
powerful, anticipating a future Judgment that will redress all
the wrongs inflicted by worldly rulers. The master ethos
values strength, nobility, and inherent self-worth, and makes
no apologies for the exercise of power. Nietzsche billed his
work as a polemic against the slave morality that he saw
dominating contemporary European culture.
Gilles Deleuze argued that Hegel and Nietzsche are
fundamentally opposite thinkers, but their thoughts about
masters and slaves show interesting points of connection.
While Nietzsche's analysis of western history seems, on its
face, to simply segregate the binaries—he affirms the ancient
aristocratic ideal and denigrates the modern Christian one—the
truth is doubtless more complicated: "The history of mankind
would be far too stupid a thing if it had not had the
intellect [Geist] of the powerless injected into it"
(Genealogy of Morals 1.3). This
observation suggests that Nietzsche accepts the broad outlines
of Hegel's dialectical view of history, in which opposites
clash to produce something greater than either one.
By the same token, it could be argued that Hegel's conception
of master and slave anticipates elements of Nietzsche's
thought. His conception is essentially parabolic: it was
inspired by his observation of actual struggles within the
political sphere (chiefly the Haitian Revolution), but he used
it to think about a broader range of human aspirations. If
Hegel's slave is construed as a figure for mankind and the
master is God, then his Aufheben names a condition
in which humanity comes to realize that it controls those
spiritual forces which have subjugated it. Such a reading
would align Hegel with Nietzsche's conviction that mankind has
moved beyond its need for a transcendent God.
Ulysses repeatedly articulates the idea that God
should be understood, in Stephen's words, as "a shout in the street,"
inseparable from human struggles, and Joyce's use of Arnoldian historiography
suggests that he saw a dialectical element in these struggles.
Arnold's Hebraism and Hellenism closely resemble Nietzsche's
slave morality and master morality, but he did not simply
advocate for the Greek ethos. He saw it instead as one element
in a relationship of antithetical, counterbalancing forces.
If, as Mr. Deasy says, "All human history moves to one great goal, the
manifestation of God" (it is a big "if"), then that
manifestation must involve dialectical resolution of the
Greek-Hebrew duality.
Certainly Stephen is engaged in some such dialectical
struggle within his own psyche. He finds himself enslaved to "two masters," the
external authorities of church and state, but his response is
more philosophical than political. When he declares to himself
that "You will not be master of others or their slave,"
he announces his ambition to realize personal power by
transcending or sublating the binary opposition. In Circe
he says, tapping his forehead, "In here it is I must
kill the priest and the king," suggesting that
ecclesiastical and political masters are empowered by the
slave's consent.